An Evaluation of Impacts of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: A Case Study of Abuja Metropolis

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Authors’ contributions

This work was carried out in collaboration among all authors. Author ABS designed the study, performed the statistical analysis, wrote the protocol and wrote the first draft of the manuscript. Authors CNJ and USI managed the analyses of the study and managed the re-reviewed the study. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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ABSTRACT

The deep and far-reaching fear, chaos and uncertainties related to the Boko Haram insurgency make an empirical study of its impacts significant. Boko Haram insurgency has not only resulted in many deaths but has adversely affected agricultural production in Nigeria and distorted local economy. The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) said Boko Haram has killed more people than any other terrorist group in the world, including the Islamic State. Boko Haram is also responsible for deaths and deprivation in an indirect way of starve-killing. Their operations have caused food shortages, created food insecurity in Nigeria resulting in many farmers either being killed, displaced or their livelihoods destroyed. Infrastructural facilities on the other hand, as well as businesses have not been spared of the devastating impacts of the Boko Haram insurgency. This study strategically examined the effectiveness of security agencies management of Boko Haram insurgencies, identified its impact and examined the best management mechanisms for the...
insurgency, within the contextual preview of Abuja metropolis. The study adopted a quantitative research design of purposive sampling approach and discovered from the research that attacks on the metropolis resulted in urban dislocation and migration. It therefore recommends increased security partnership, improved welfare for security agencies, training of security agencies in intelligence gathering and management, encourage and strengthen grass root community policing.

**Keywords:** Boko Haram; insurgency; Abuja.

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The impacts of insurgencies have produced differing, cyclic rippling effects. Feldman [1] in a paper titled “The Root Causes of Terrorism: Why Parts of Africa Might Never Be at Peace,” noted that ten years ago when scholars and analysts wrote about security in Africa, Nigeria and the Lake Chad region were rarely registered in their assessments. That may have been understandable: There was still no insurgency in the region, and the group popularly known as Boko Haram (Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad) which literally means “Western education is sinful” in the Hausa language, was considered “moderate revivalists attempting to implement social change.” The violent potential of Boko Haram was neither recognized nor anticipated [2].

The launch of Boko Haram’s insurgency in 2009 instantaneously forced observers and scholars to reassess the threat it posed both in the interim and post impact. Although some analysts initially denied that Boko Haram was receiving training, funding, and weapons from other Jihadi groups; officials and researchers in West Africa recognized afore time that Boko Haram had cultivated networks to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabaab [3]. There is evidence that these two groups, in particular, assisted Boko Haram in rapidly increasing its tactical sophisticated attacks, such as with suicide bombing after 2009 [4,5] and by 2016, Boko Haram was not only ranked the “most deadly” jihadist group in Africa, but also the world (Global Terrorism Index, [6]).

Despite the Nigerian government escalating military actions against the Boko Haram sect, violent extremism and insurgency show no lasting sign of decline within the country’s security space. The Boko Haram insurgent group continues to expand and commit violent acts, such as sporadic suicide bombings and killing of citizens within the country leading to socio-economic and urban/rural dislocation in Nigeria.

Reviewing the effects of insurgency in Nigeria, Babalola [7] observed that the current situation in Nigeria is a combustible mix of violent extremism, and thriving homegrown insurgencies. The spate of brutal killings and the numerous threats by violent extremist groups, particularly the Boko Haram sect, have called to question lasting peace and safety within the country for Nigerians and foreigners alike. Many Nigerians are now forced to live in fear, as they are subjected to unprecedented levels of chaos and havoc, which include indiscriminate bombings and killings, such as have never been witnessed before, not even during the 1967-1970 civil war. Hill [8] attributed the Boko Haram scourge to failure of the Nigerian state.

Insurgency appears to be ripping apart the fabric of Nigeria’s unity. Despite the deployment of troops in various states of Nigeria to tackle rising insurgency, the Boko Haram sect seems more resilient than ever, because the Nigerian government appears incapable of curbing the menace affecting the lives of its citizens.

Contributory factors such as socio-economic inequalities, injustice, corruption, ethnic intolerance and religious extremism are some of the trajectories which have culminated and metamorphosed into fanatical movements demanding for radical changes in Nigeria. Insurgencies and terrorism have become the order of the day thus posing complex security challenges, threatening political and social stability as well the migration trend of urban dislocations.

Boko Haram insurgency has devastated several areas in Nigeria particularly in northeastern geopolitical zone and neighboring regions of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Attacks and abuses that Nigerians would never have thought possible in the country have become a commonplace: Girls as suicide bombers, the reinstitution of “slavery,” mass immolation of students in their dormitories, among others. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps are scattered across various states in Nigeria, and the task of
returning IDPs to their homes has been as intricate as it has been dangerous.

In a conflict that has no easy answers and no solutions in sight, Boko Haram is already and will remain one of Africa’s most enduring insurgencies Feldman [1]. In order to better understand the impacts of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, this study undertakes an evaluation of the insurgent group’s activities in Abuja metropolis, 2009-2015. It explores five areas that are increasingly important but under-researched about Boko Haram in Abuja: nature, rampancy of its attacks, effectiveness of security agencies management strategies, impacts and best option management frameworks.

1.1 Problematic Insight of the Impact

Insurgent groups, particularly the Boko Haram sect, threaten the very existence of Nigerian unity and have aided in creating the vicious cycle of fear, chaos and uncertainties. Despite the Nigerian government’s deployment of troops and increase of military presence via check-points, violence related to Boko Haram insurgency has continued with no sign of abating in Nigeria. The impacts of violence related to Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria at large and Abuja metropolis in particular are better imagined than evaluated. Some scholars (24, 24) emphasized the negative impacts of conflict on Nigeria’s national development.

Many scholars’ (13; 23; 11; 12; 17, 13, 15) works on armed insurgency in Nigeria have focused on approaches to end the Boko Haram conflict. These studies have suggested various models like the direct and indirect approaches adopted for ending insurgency in Nigeria. However, most of these researches fail to evaluate the impacts of insurgency in Abuja metropolis. The tendency amongst existing scholarship on Boko Haram has been to concentrate on analyzing the socio-economic and political aspects of the conflict environment, to the exclusion of the nature of the group’s attacks. Thus, the conclusions reached on how to end the violence do not emanate from an interrogation of the characteristics of the group, but emerge out of a focus on the environmental factors that supposedly produced grievance and subsequently, violence.

Scholars have identified a number of factors, which include endemic poverty, widespread corruption, weak state structure, social frustration, and mismanagement of resource endowment, as contributing to the scale of violent insurgency in Nigeria. This study examines the contextual factors that are salient in explaining the nature and management strategies of insurgency in Nigeria under the context of Abuja metropolis. Uzodike (2011) suggested that social frustration and aggression has triggered violent extremism and insurgency in Nigeria, especially in the northern part of the country.

1.2 Research Questions

i. What was the nature of Boko Haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis?

ii. How effective was security agencies’ management of Boko Haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis?

iii. How has Boko Haram insurgency impacted on Abuja metropolis?

iv. How can Boko Haram insurgency be best managed in Abuja metropolis?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study is to undertake an evaluation of impacts of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria-A case study of Abuja Metropolis. The specific objectives are to:

i. Identify the nature of Boko Haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis

ii. Examine the effectiveness of security agencies management of Boko Haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis

iii. Identify the impacts of Boko Haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis

iv. Examine the best management mechanisms for Boko Haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Conceptual Clarifications

2.1.1 Insurgencies

Insurgencies seek to overthrow an existing order with one that is commensurate with their political, economic, ideological or religious goals (Gompert & Gordon 2008: 23). According to Kilcullen, “Insurgency is a struggle to control a contested political space, between a state (or a group of states or occupying powers), and one or more popularly based, non-state challengers” (Kilcullen 2006: 112). Kilcullen also try to draw a
line between classical and contemporary insurgencies thus: while the latter seek to replace the existing order, the former sometimes strive for the expulsion of foreign invaders from their territory or seek to fill an existing power vacuum (Kilcullen 2006: 112). Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines insurgency as “an armed rebellion against a constituted authority (for example, an authority recognized as such by the United Nations) when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents.

The British Army counter-insurgency manual, Army Field Manual (7) defined insurgency as:

“The actions of a minority group within a state, who are intent on forcing political change by a means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of the people to accept such a change. It is an organized, armed political struggle, the goals of which might be diverse. (7)”

2.2 The Nature of Insurgency

Basically, insurgents often pursue some common objectives targeted at undermining the legitimacy of the government while increasing their own ties with the population. According to the 2012 “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency” published by the US Government, insurgencies seek to accomplish the following:

i. Undercut the ability of the government to provide the population security and public services, including utilities, education, and justice. An insurgent group may attempt to supplant the government by providing alternative services to the people, or it may be content to portray the government as impotent.

ii. Obtain the active or passive support of the population. Not all support has to be—or is likely to be—gained from true sympathizers; fear and intimidation can gain the acquiescence of many people.

iii. Provoking the government into committing abuses that drive neutral civilians toward the insurgents and solidify the loyalty of insurgent supporters.

iv. Undermine international support for the government and, if possible, gain international recognition or assistance for the insurgency.

2.3 Typologies

Insurgencies have been categorized in different ways such as by: goal, tactics, size, region, duration, international significance and the character of the regime being challenged (Gompert and Gordon, 2008: 23-24). Many insurgencies also exhibit a combination of these characteristics or such may evolve during the course of the conflict. In line with the base of supporters, John Mackinlay developed the typologies too. These insurgencies he categorized into lumpen clan, popular and global (Mackinlay, 2002: 43). Drawing the types of insurgencies from their specific goals, the US Government Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (2012:3) noted the following five typologies:

i. Revolutionary insurgencies seek to replace the existing political order with an entirely different system, often entailing transformation of the economic and social structures.

ii. Reformist insurgencies do not aim to change the existing political order but, instead, seek to compel the government to alter its policies or undertake political, economic, or social reforms.

iii. Separatist insurgencies seek independence for a specific region. In some cases, the region in question spans existing national boundaries.

iv. Resistance insurgencies seek to compel an occupying power to withdraw from a given territory.

v. Commercialist insurgencies are motivated by the acquisition of wealth or material resources; political power is simply a tool for seizing and controlling access to the wealth.

2.4 Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

The contextualization of Boko Haram’s emergence is one area that has attracted scholarly interest since the insurgency began. The debate in this stream revolves around the place of relative deprivation and religion in the emergence of Boko Haram. While some scholars emphasize the role of perceived socio-economic and political inequalities [9,10,11], other scholars situate the group’s emergence within the pre-existing climate of Islamic extremism in northern Nigeria ([12,13,14]; Celso, 2015). The second stream, which includes [15,16,17] focuses on the worsening effect of the insurgency on Christian-
Muslim divide in Nigeria. Research in the third stream is focused on assessing how the conflict has affected the economy of the Sahelian region [18,19,20,21,22]. The fourth stream, the feminism-informed literature, explores the gender dimensions of the conflict’s impact [23,24,25,26]. However, this study evaluates the impact of boko haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis, which represents a section in the second stream exploration.

Debate amongst scholars is primarily concerned with advocating either peaceful counterinsurgency or military counterinsurgency. The studies focused on peaceful mainly identify dialogue and compromise as the only viable path to sustainable peace (23; Yusuf, 2013; 13). However, other scholars, such as Nwankpa and Roumani, [27], consider such proposals to be ill-conceived because they emanate from the relative success of the approach in a different kind of conflict. The military focused works evaluate the military response and explore the viability of a regional approach to combating Boko Haram. Some scholars within this cluster are critical of the military response to Boko Haram. Their critique revolves around lack of expertise and the tendency of coercion to further alienate the civilian population [28,29].

Consequently, by evaluating the impacts of Boko Haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis, this study fills a gap in scholarship. In contrast to much of the existing scholarship on Boko Haram, this study unraveled the dominant nature of insurgency attacks in Nigeria within the context of Abuja metropolis by moving the analysis away from the environmental context and concentrating more on the group’s features and management strategies adopted and deployed by security agencies in attempts to curtail insurgents activities in Nigeria.

3. METHODOLOGY

This study was conducted within Abuja metropolis. The choice of Abuja metropolis was informed by the fact that it is the Federal Capital City of Nigeria and more importantly, it hosts the headquarters offices of most of the security agencies in the country and it is a melting pot for all the various ethnic groups in Nigeria. In view of this, the study population emerged from various categories of Abuja residents e.g. Civil servants, students, security agents, business owners, artisans. The study provides new analyses and insights data based exclusive primary on primary source materials and dataset.

A sample size of 352 respondents was purposely selected to serve as the target population for the study. Asika [30] argues that sampling techniques allow researchers to have a good feel of the entire population and conform to some control measures dictated by some inherent characteristics of the population of interest. In view of this, the sample from the various stakeholders was not equally selected but randomly administered. More importantly, the sample selection process was determined by the availability, accessibility and willingness of respondents to participate in the survey.

The research questions generated was answered by organizing the responses to items 1-5 into frequencies and percentages in brackets as shown in Tables and the emerging data were used to identify the nature of Boko Haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis. The alphabets were coded using rating scale of: SA = 5, A = 4, D = 4, SD = 3, DN = 2, U = 1 respectively.

4. DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Presentation of Findings

4.1.1 Descriptive statistics

4.1.1.1 RQ 1: What was the nature of Boko Haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis?

This research question was answered by organizing the response to items 1-5 into frequencies and percentages in brackets as shown in Table 1 and the emerging data were used to identify the nature of Boko Haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis. The alphabets were coded using rating scale of: SA = 5, A = 4, D = 4, SD = 3, DN = 2, U = 1 respectively.

The Table 1 shows that 52% of the respondents agreed that boko haram attacks were carried out in public places between 2009-2015, also 45.7% of the respondents agreed that boko haram insurgency related attacks in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015 was carried out by suicide bombers. 41.1% of the respondents agreed that boko haram insurgency attacks in Abuja metropolis was carried out to create fear in the minds of residents of the city. In addition, 67.4% of the respondents stated that boko haram insurgency related attacks was not politically motivated.
Table 1. Respondents’ opinion about the nature of Boko Haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Description of Items</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>DN</th>
<th>U</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Boko haram insurgency attacks was carried out in public places</td>
<td>28 (8%)</td>
<td>182 (52%)</td>
<td>118 (33.7%)</td>
<td>10 (2.9%)</td>
<td>12 (3.4%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Boko haram insurgency attacks were carried out by suicide bombers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160 (45.7%)</td>
<td>154 (44%)</td>
<td>34 (9.7%)</td>
<td>2 (0.6%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Boko haram insurgency attacks were done to create fear in residents of Abuja metropolis</td>
<td>42 (12%)</td>
<td>144 (41.1%)</td>
<td>118 (33.7%)</td>
<td>40 (11.4%)</td>
<td>6 (1.7%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Boko haram insurgency attacks was carried out in the night</td>
<td>18 (5.1%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>236 (67.4%)</td>
<td>26 (7.4%)</td>
<td>70 (20%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Boko haram insurgency attacks in Abuja metropolis were politically motivated</td>
<td>2 (0.6%)</td>
<td>310 (88.6%)</td>
<td>4 (1.1%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34 (9.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source, Fieldwork, 2018

Therefore, considering the information gathered from the Table 1, it can be asserted that the nature of boko haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015 are as follows: The attacks were carried out in public places, the attacks were undertaken by suicide bombers, the attacks were carried out to create fear in the hearts of the city’s residents, the attacks were carried not carried out in the night and were not politically motivated.

4.1.1.2 RQ 2: How effective was security agencies management of Boko Haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis?

This research question was answered by organizing the response to items 6-10 into frequencies and percentages in brackets as shown in Table 2 and the emerging data were used to evaluate the effectiveness of security agencies management of Boko Haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis. The alphabets were coded using rating scale of: SA = 6, A = 5, D = 4, SD = 3, DN = 2, U = 1 respectively.

Table 2 shows that 69.7% of respondents observed that security agencies did not quickly evacuate wounded persons after boko haram insurgency attacks in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015 while 70.3% of the respondents indicated that security agencies notified the public immediately the boko haram insurgency attacks occurred between 2009-2015. In the same vein, 70.3% of the respondents opined that security agencies did not quickly apprehend the planners and executors of boko haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015. In addition, 26.9% of the respondents strongly stated that security agencies have relevant equipments and machines to detect insurgency attacks before the occurred in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015 while 31.4% indicated that the stoppage of boko haram insurgency attacks in Abuja metropolis was not due to the effectiveness of security agencies in managing insurgency.

From the findings, it can be deduced that security agencies did not respond quickly in terms of evacuating the wounded during boko haram insurgency attacks in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015. Also, security agencies quickly notified Abuja residents whenever boko haram insurgency attacks occurred in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015. Respondents overwhelmingly (70.3%) observed that security agencies did not quickly apprehend the planners and executors of boko haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015. Responses as to whether security agencies had relevant equipments and machines to detect insurgency attacks was divisive. While majority (29.6%) strongly agreed, 14.3% disagreed, and 17.1% did not know. Similarly, 31.4% respondents stated that boko haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis has stopped but not due to effectiveness of security agencies, 30.3% agreed, while 8.6% did not know.

4.1.1.3 RQ 3: How has Boko Haram insurgency impacted on Abuja metropolis?

This research question was answered by organizing the response to items 11-15 into frequencies and percentages in brackets as shown in Table 3 and the emerging data were
used to evaluate the impacts of Boko Haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015. The alphabets were coded using rating scale of: SA = 6, A = 5, D = 4, SD = 3, DN = 2, U = 1 respectively.

The Table 3 shows that 52% of the respondents agreed that boko haram insurgency attacks has led to closure/relocation of businesses in Abuja metropolis, also 45.7% of the respondents agreed that boko haram insurgency related attacks have led to relocation of persons from Abuja metropolis to other states, 41.1% of the respondents agreed that boko haram insurgency attacks have led to migration of residents from Abuja city centers to suburb areas. In addition,

Table 2. Respondents opinions on the effectiveness of security agencies management of Boko Haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Description of Items</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>DN</th>
<th>U</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Security agencies evacuated wounded persons quickly after boko haram insurgency attacks in Abuja metropolis</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(29.1%)</td>
<td>(69.7%)</td>
<td>(1.1%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Security agencies notified the public immediately after the boko haram insurgency attacks</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(29.1%)</td>
<td>(70.3%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.6%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Security agencies quickly apprehended suspected boko haram insurgents who planned and executed the attacks</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.6%)</td>
<td>(70.3%)</td>
<td>(29.1%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Security agencies have relevant equipments and machines to detect boko haram insurgency attacks before the occur in Abuja metropolis</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(26.9%)</td>
<td>(14.3%)</td>
<td>(14.3%)</td>
<td>(12%)</td>
<td>(17.1%)</td>
<td>(15.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Boko haram insurgency attacks have stopped in Abuja due to effectiveness of security agencies</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(9.1%)</td>
<td>(30.3%)</td>
<td>(31.4%)</td>
<td>(15.4%)</td>
<td>(8.6%)</td>
<td>(5.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source, Fieldwork, 2018

Table 3. Respondents’ opinion on the impacts of Boko Haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Description of Items</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>DN</th>
<th>U</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Boko haram insurgency has led to closure/relocation of businesses in Abuja metropolis</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(8%)</td>
<td>(52%)</td>
<td>(33.7%)</td>
<td>(2.9%)</td>
<td>(3.4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Boko haram insurgency has led to mass relocation of persons from Abuja metropolis to other states</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(45.7%)</td>
<td>(44%)</td>
<td>(9.7%)</td>
<td>(0.6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Boko haram insurgency has lead to migrations from city centers to suburbs of Abuja metropolis</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(12%)</td>
<td>(41.1%)</td>
<td>(33.7%)</td>
<td>(11.4%)</td>
<td>(1.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Boko haram insurgency has lead to constant traffic hold-up in some areas of Abuja metropolis</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(5.1%)</td>
<td>(67.4%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(7.4%)</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Boko haram insurgency has brought about massive presence of security agents on roads within Abuja metropolis</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.6%)</td>
<td>(88.6%)</td>
<td>(1.1%)</td>
<td>(9.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source, Fieldwork, 2018
### Table 4. Respondents opinions on how Boko Haram insurgency can be best managed in Abuja metropolis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Description of Items</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>DN</th>
<th>U</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Security agencies should partner/collaborate and share information</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29.1%)</td>
<td>(69.7%)</td>
<td>(1.1%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Security agencies should adopt ICT/technology in management of insurgency</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29.1%)</td>
<td>(70.3%)</td>
<td>(0.6%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Government should address the root causes of insurgency</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(70.3%)</td>
<td>(29.1%)</td>
<td>(0.6%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Government should introduce the teaching of counter-insurgency related subjects in primary, secondary and tertiary institutions</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(26.9%)</td>
<td>(14.3%)</td>
<td>(14.3%)</td>
<td>(12%)</td>
<td>(17.1%)</td>
<td>(15.4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Residents of Abuja should always be observant and report suspected objects/persons to security agencies</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29.1%)</td>
<td>(70.3%)</td>
<td>(0.6%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source, Fieldwork, 2018

67.4% of the respondents stated that boko haram insurgency related attacks have brought about constant traffic hold-ups in some areas of Abuja metropolis. Also 88.6% of respondents stated that boko haram insurgency attacks have brought about massive presence of security agents on roads within Abuja metropolis.

Therefore, considering the information gathered from the Table 3, it implies that boko haram insurgency attacks in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015 brought about impacts that are still very much noticeable within Abuja metropolis. These includes: Relocation/closure of businesses, relocation of persons from Abuja to other states, relocation of residents from city centers to suburbs, increased traffic in some areas and massive presence of security agents on roads within Abuja metropolis.

4.1.1.4 RQ 4: How can Boko Haram insurgency be better managed in Abuja metropolis?

This research question was answered by organizing the response to items 16-20 into frequencies and percentages in brackets as shown in Table 4 and the emerging data were used to identify the best option management strategies for the boko haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis. The alphabets were coded using rating scale of: SA = 6, A = 5, D = 4, SD = 3, DN = 2, U = 1 respectively.

Table 4 shows that 69.7% of respondents observed that security agencies should partner/collaborate and share information while 70.3% of the respondents indicated that security agencies need to adopt ICT/technology in the management of boko haram insurgency. In the same vein, 70.3% of the respondents opined that government needs to address the root causes of insurgency. In addition, 26.9% of the respondents strongly stated that government should introduce the teaching of counter-insurgency subjects at primary, secondary and tertiary institutions while 70.3% agreed that residents of Abuja metropolis should always be observant and report suspected objects/persons to security agencies.

Findings implies that some of the ways of managing boko haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis includes: partnership/collaboration between security agencies, deployment of ICT/technology by security agencies, addressing the root causes of insurgency, teaching of counter insurgency and increased security consciousness on the part of residents of Abuja metropolis.

5. DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS

This study undertook an evaluation of impacts of boko haram insurgency in Nigeria using Abuja metropolis as case study between 2009-2015. Findings revealed that the nature of boko haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015 is similar to the findings made in previous studies undertaken. Some of the findings are as follows: the attacks were carried out in public places, the attacks were undertaken by suicide bombers, the attacks were carried out to create...
fear in the hearts of the city’s residents, the attacks were carried not carried out in the night and were not politically motivated.

Findings from the study also revealed that security agencies did not respond quickly in terms of evacuating the wounded during boko haram insurgency attacks in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015. Also, security agencies quickly notified Abuja residents whenever boko haram insurgency attacks occurred in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015. Respondents overwhelmingly observed that security agencies did not quickly apprehend the planners and executors of boko haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015. Responses as to whether security agencies had relevant equipments and machines to detect insurgency attacks was divisive, however, majority of the respondents disagreed. Also, majority of respondents stated that boko haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis has stopped but not due to effectiveness of security agencies.

Also, findings indicated that boko haram insurgency attacks in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015 brought about impacts that are still very much noticeable within Abuja metropolis. These includes: relocation/closure of businesses, relocation of persons from Abuja to other states, relocation of residents from city centers to suburbs, increased traffic in some areas and massive presence of security agents on roads within Abuja metropolis.

Furthermore, findings showed that some of the ways of managing boko haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis includes: partnership/collaboration between security agencies, deployment of ICT/technology by security agencies, addressing the root causes of insurgency, teaching of counter insurgency and increased security consciousness on the part of residents of Abuja metropolis.

6. CONCLUSION

This study on an evaluation of impacts of boko haram insurgency in Nigeria: a case study of Abuja metropolis had 350 questionnaire respondents. Two hundred and forty one of the respondents representing 68.8% indicated their sex to be male while one hundred and nine of the respondents representing 31.2% indicated female as their sex. 26% of the respondents were between ages 20-29; 36.5% were between ages 30-39; 24% were between ages 40-49, 9% of the respondents were 50 years and above while 2.5% of the respondents were below 20 years; This implies that majority of the respondents are within ages 30-39 years while the least number of respondents were 20 years and below representing 2.5%. Respondents with primary education were 9%; those with secondary education were 41.5% while respondents with tertiary education were 49.5%. Therefore, majority of the study’s respondents have tertiary education. Hence, findings from the study are summarized below:

1. Data from the study in respect of research question which investigated the nature of Boko Haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015 revealed that the attacks were carried out in public places, the attacks were undertaken by suicide bombers, the attacks were carried out to create fear in the hearts of the city’s residents, the attacks were carried not carried out in the night and were not politically motivated.

2. Research objective two which sought to examine the effectiveness of security agencies management of Boko Haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015 indicated that security agencies did not respond quickly in terms of evacuating the wounded during boko haram insurgency attacks in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015. Also, security agencies quickly notified Abuja residents whenever boko haram insurgency attacks occurred in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015. Respondents overwhelmingly observed that security agencies did not quickly apprehend the planners and executors of boko haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis between 2009-2015. Responses as to whether security agencies had relevant equipments and machines to detect insurgency attacks was divisive, however, majority of the respondents disagreed. Also, majority of respondents stated that boko haram insurgency in Abuja metropolis has stopped but not due to effectiveness of security agencies.

3. Findings on research question three which focused on the impacts of boko haram insurgency on Abuja metropolis revealed that some of the impacts are: relocation/closure of businesses, relocation of persons from Abuja to other states,
7. RECOMMENDATIONS

In line with the findings of this study, the following are recommended to address impacts of insurgency in Abuja metropolis:

1. Increased partnership between security agencies and residents of Abuja metropolis through ensuring that community policing is brought to the grass root.
2. Government should provide equipment’s and improve the manpower and welfare of security agencies. Indeed, the number of security agents protecting and securing lives and properties in Abuja is grossly inadequate compared to the number of persons and the size of Abuja.
3. Security agents should be trained and kept abreast with insurgency fighting tactics because insurgents apply non-conventional warfare tactics, hence security agents should be aware and knowledgeable about these tactics.
4. A more robust and proactive measure should be taken by government to address the root causes of insurgency such as unemployment, religious fanaticism, etc.

COMPETING INTERESTS

Authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

REFERENCES


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