ABSTRACT

Bringing together two nations that are so disconnected from culture and history was a major task. China's attempts to develop a new kind of great power relationship and a new type of military-to-military relationship with the United State is not a major turning point. Political relations place restrictions for military cooperation and the two countries were unable to establish a viable strategic relationship. That has attributed to a trend in military ties which is on and off. Trends show a level of frequent interruptions in military-to-military interactions between 2000 and 2010, accompanied by a rise in relationships starting in 2012 to date. However, hurdles on both ends are likely to restrict mutual understanding and inhibit the advancement of military-to-military ties in the future. The issue of Taiwan, China behaviors in the SCS, and its hegemony in the region were too insignificant to form a foundation for a permanent partnership.

Keywords: Foreign policy; International relations; Global power; military relations.
1. INTRODUCTION

The motive of this paper is to look critically into the framework of present international relations, with an emphasis on “The theoretical evaluation of US-China foreign policy in relation to Military. This paper tends to shed more light on the military interaction between US and China. There are distinct views and descriptions of US-China foreign policy. Hence this interaction between US and China will be examined in details. The first thing will be to look at the emergence of China as a global power militarily between Mao and Xi regime. Also, international relations theories backing this research will be examined in details. Further military ties between the US and China will be divided into two segments namely: (i) US-China relation in the early 1990s; (ii) US-China relation in the 21st century. Within the international relation spheres, this paper examines recent trends in Sino-US security relations, with a particular focus on military-to-military relations and China’s call for building a new type of military-to-military relations with the United States. Since the normalizing relations in 1979, the USA and China have worked on the security of a number of international concerns. Indeed, collaboration on safety started before state-to-state relations were formally established. We remember that at the time of the Cold War, both nations showed the ability of Washington and Pekin to cooperate in the event that there was an urgent and discussed security issue (in this case, the former Soviet Union). Also in the course of the 21st century, the relationship between the US and China will be of significant interest, based solely on the prediction that China will be able to delegitimize or complement US power in the coming years. There have been fluctuations in the US-China ties after People’s Republic of China (PRC) was created in 1949 four years after the world war 2.

The military future of China is not a mystery to the globe. Even within the nation, it’s a secret. Even leading rulers do not understand whether China in the decades ahead will become America's friend or enemies. Inevitably, Chinese military destiny, other inner development and the fate of cross-strait relations, will be determined by its next generation of rulers, and America's strategic reaction will form the futures of the US-China partnership as well. In view of this strategic dilemma, the US has nothing but a two-pronged strategy with regard to China. One thing that is needed is to involve China and to promote it in the global community as an "accountable stakeholder." The second is to undertake "prudent hedging," not the enmity of the nation, against China's competitive or hostile conduct. Uncertain of what the future could be, Chinese leaders will also hedge. Regrettably, these attempts will be seen in Washington as the very sign of the U.S. competitive behavior.

The prospect that the Taiwan Straits will be a war zone has long dominated the US-China policy, but the military stance of both nations reflects a number of extra strategic issues. The worldwide obligations of the United States demand that it preserves its armed forces qualitative supremacy and quantitative adequacy. For a range of existing and future tasks, the Defense Department will obtain an expropriation in excess of $700 billion in 2018, but most are totally unattached to East Asia. Simultaneously, China builds a military capacity to meet its worldwide aspirations and prevails with a defense budget of US$175 billion in its regional rivalries in 2018. In the eyes of China, it still has not had sufficient military strength to pursue its crucial potential role. In addition, in comparison to its neighbors, Chinese assess its military might against India, Japan, Russia, and the United States to discourage and exaggerate. In Southern China, China's military accumulation mainly occurs on most islands. The questions that arise from this build up by China is how should the USA respond? Between maintaining its current capabilities and engaging in an all-out drive to be a military peer of the United States, where will China end up? Where will China increase in military strength and capabilities ends up?

In international relations, there are various theories that can be applied to the research questions of this paper. The two theories that will looked at in this paper are; (i) the neorealism and (ii) the neoliberal institutionalism. Neorealism or structural realism is a theory of international relations that emphasize the importance of power in international relations. According to Dunne & Schmidt [1] and Wohlforth [2], it is a prevailing theories in politics and international relations. On the other hand, Neorealism or structural realism is a theory that claims power to be the most essential factor in international relations. Political scientists such as Dunne and Schmidt [1], argue that realism could be partitioned into subsets with its most popular division into classical realism and neorealism. The neoliberal institutionalism which refers to a school of thought which believes that states are, or at least should be, concerned first and foremost with absolute gains rather than
relative gains to other states. In the 1970s and 1980s, the increasing importance of other actors besides the nation-state has so far challenged the prevailing school of thinking. These actors, such as transnational corporations or interest groups, described the need for certain changes in the traditional liberal theory [3].

2. U.S.-CHINA MILITARY RELATIONS

2.1 U.S.-China Military Relations in the 1990s

The US-China military ties were the hardest during the 90's, and the two defense-military institutions had to work together on the safety side alone. The US-initiated hiatus in military relations barely lasted five years in 1989. In November 1994, Chas W. Freeman, Jr. (Deputy Assistant Secretary), was silently sent to Beijing, where the USA and China again started to restore their military contact program [4]. When the two organizations approached each other again in the mid-1990s, the wider context of global safety had altered significantly. Several problems originally made the Chinese army careful to reengage its American counterparts too profoundly. Firstly, as a consequence of 1989 suspension, the PLA’s unwillingness toward the United States was deep (yet still echoes today in certain PLA circles). Chinese security challenges have been overcome by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and enhanced Sino-Russian ties, but by the end of the cold war, China had not led to a multi-polar global order, which China significantly wished for. Rather, the U.S. remained the "sole superpower" [4]. From a Chinese view, this is not totally a beneficial result.

Throughout this era, some U.S. security policies were considered partially contrary to Chinese concerns. In the 1990s, for instance: in Haiti; in Somalia; and particularly in the Balkans, Beijing observed with disgust the US intervening in military forces worldwide. More specifically linked to China’s security interests have been seen in other US security policies. These involved improving Washington’s different military partnerships in the region of Asia-Pacific particularly and gaining momentum throughout the decade through the Pentagon’s missile protection program. With its part, Chinese military revitalization programs and particularly the opacity related to these programs became uncomfortable in the US defense establishment. The kinds of arms systems that the Russians supplied the PLA with modern aircraft, naval surface boats, and submarines, air protection systems, etc. have become more and more of a concern. With good luck for China, the Russian defense industry, financially sober, was more than prepared to remedy the gaps remaining when the United States technology shifts stopped in the 1990s. However, the reappearance of Taiwan into a dividing problem between the US and China, rather than any other advancement in the 1990s, made military connections hard to achieve and made it highly likely that the two militaries could have a security co-operation perspective [5].

The “Taiwan identity” and Taiwan’s future connection with the mainland became component of the sparky national discussion on the island which has continued till today, as Taiwan’s impending democracy started to take root and evolve. Chinese military planners again focused attention on this island, worried about political developments in Taiwan, anxious for the apparently bad prospects of short-term reunification and alarmed at the United States and France weapons sales to Taipei in the early 1990s. The new emphasis by the PLA on Taiwan, not by the leadership of the CCP, was approved by. At an extended meeting of the Central Military Commission, Jiang Zemin delivered an inspiring speech on 13 January 1993, "The Global Situation and Military Strategic Guidelines. Our goal in the military now and for some time to come is to avoid any great Taiwan independence incidents from Taiwan being promoted," Jiang said. The U.S. malicious handler of the Beijing Lee visit and the upcoming presidential election to Taiwan in 1996 [6] was the reaction of Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui two years later at Cornell University. In July 1995 and March 1996, the Chinese leaders agreed to use the PLA for noticeable force protests.

Those manifestations provide massive military drills off the continent and, most worrying, rocket launchings (tests) on and around the Taiwan Strait. Consequently, at the mid-1990s, it hadn’t been since before the early 1950s although the Taiwan issue was re-militarized. The Taiwan issue was largely a political issue with a military element during most of the 1980s. In the mid-1990s, a political aspect, an unacceptable and harmful change had become a mainly military issue [7]. This was the case all across Lee Teng-hui’s Presidency (1990-2000) as well as during Chen Shui-bian’s leadership (2000-2008). Although the appointment of Ma
Ying-Jeou in 2008 the cross-cutting of political and economic ties between Beijing and Taipei have significantly enhanced, controlled by the cross-cutting dynamic of these aspects [8]. However, the military aspects of the problem have not been overlooked; they simply live behind and may reappear.

The militarization of Taiwan in the 1990s made defense and army relations more complex. Some Chinese compatriots have asserted over the years that the 1995 and 1996 missile launches were effective as Washington, Taipei and Tokyo have been informed that the problem of Taiwan is severe to Beijing [9]. That is a reasonable and accurate viewpoint as far as this is concerned. The flights of the PRC missile in 1995 and 1996 alongside the nuclear and missile programs of the DPRK eventually had a negative impact on many other safety concerns in China. In 1997, the amended "U.S.-Japan Recommendations for Development Cooperation" were partly galvanized and partly closed (as a result, from a Chinese standpoint [9]. The United States-Japan military alliance was further dissatisfied. In the 1990s, missile launches and drills were both at the root of increased regional worries over Chinese intentions in combination with PRC army modernization programs.

Of course, the launch of the rocket did nothing at all to please the US defense, army, and safety institutions. In the US legislative branch, they created worry in particular. By the end of the decade, US military ties with China were interrupted by US national politics with worries about PLA missile deployments across Taiwan and other safety concerns. As a consequence, Congress implemented laws to limit the relations between the Department of Defense and the PLA. The requirements for the Pentagon to generate the yearly Congress Report, which maintains the controversial point in military relations until today, also came into force by the Pentagon's legislation [10].

2.2 U.S.-China Military Relations in the 21st Century

The general trend in US-China relations has been very favorable during the first decade of the 21st century. Even though there have been different differences in the partnership. Washington and Beijing have begun to enhance their consulting and coordinating practices on problems of political and economic concern and interest [8]. In that era, the United States backed the accession of China to the WTO (2001) and developed a top-level advisory dialog such as the Senior Dialogue (2005) and the SED (2006). Substantially, in the course of the Six-Party Discussions which concentrated on the atomic arms problem of the DPRK, significant safety debate and coordination between U.S. and China authorities also took place in 2003. The chances of the two defense-military institutions for safety collaboration were less hopeful. For military ties, the decade started poorly [11].

On 1 April 2001, following the "EP-3 Incident," a new military connection had scarcely emerged from the errant US bombing of the PRC Embassy in Belgrade. Deepening currents of worry were flooding on either side of the Pacific which went beyond Taiwan and addressed the broad problem of mutual mistrusts over strategic plans. The Chinese military and civilian safety analysts were persuaded that the US defense's enemy had always had to wait for programmed ends and that they estimated that the Pentagon had established itself in China at the start of the first decade of the 21st century [12]. President George W. Bush's regime entered office with the motto "China as a strategic rival, this assessment was strengthened almost instantly. This perspective has also been confirmed across the century by Chinese commentators reading public domain accounts from the United States. Government reports on Chinese military strength to Congress, such as the variants of the quadrennial defense report (2001,2006) and the national security strategy of the White House (2002, 2006) [7].

These papers obviously recognized China as a prospective long-term, strategic issue to be tackled. Chinese military analysts have not missed that point. However, while U.S. defense analyst suggested that China could become a long-term military contestant (a chance), some Chinese analysts took the step towards deciding that the US was already viewing China as an "enemy" here and now. During the decade, Chinese representatives of defense also became more worried over other problems: the evolving US-Indian defense partnership in Asia (in particular, the fresh focus on Guam as a base for U.S. naval and air assets), U.S. armed Forces in central Asia and U.S. military high seas operations in the Exclusive Economic Zone of China. As a result of such problems and others, some Chinese military and civilian safety experts found that the United States was not only committed to keeping Taiwan cut off its
motherlands but also to surround China and usually delay the rising of China, that is, that the US have never left a long-term separated China and westward policy. China is a long time strategy.

The Chinese military started one of the most considerable times of development after the PRC had been created in 1949 by the enactment of the Military Strategic Directives for the New Era in 1993, a mechanism which persists until this day. This Modernization program was in place by 2000, the beginning of that first decade of the 21st Century. Reflecting US concerns about the risk of accidents resulting from aggressive PLA intercepts of US surveillance aircraft and ships, the two militaries also agreed on a MOU on Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters. Drawing on existing international agreements and practice, the two sides agreed on a framework MOU in November 2014 that included annexes with terms of reference and rules for surface-to-surface encounters. An additional annex governing air-to-air encounters was signed during Xi Jinping's visit to Washington in September 2015. The two militaries also reached agreement on crisis communications mechanisms that specified how they would use a new secure video link to communicate. What explains this expansion of US–China military-to-military relations? Xi Jinping's call for a 'NTGPR' and concomitant calls for a new type of military-to-military relations provided a positive political environment for expanded PLA interactions with the US military.

PLA leaders were more interested in expanding military ties to learn from the United States than in the past and more confident that PLA units were capable of holding up their end in military interactions without the risk of embarrassing failures. Moreover, the lack of major US arms sales to Taiwan from 2012 until the end of 2015 meant that China did not face a hard decision on whether to sever or greatly curtail military ties in response. When the United States announced plans to sell two warships and anti-tank missiles to Taiwan in December 2015, China’s official response was relatively restrained, and did not include a major suspension of military-to-military ties. The most important reason for China’s desire to build a new type of military-to-military relationship with the United States rests on the same strategic logic that underpins Chinese leadership efforts to stabilize US-–China political relations: to prevent the United States from deciding to confront China. Given increasing military competition in the space, cyber, and nuclear domains and increasing air and naval interactions between the two militaries (with the risk of incidents or accidents that might escalate), Chinese leaders may have decided that the previous pattern of on-again, off-again military ties posed unacceptable risks.

Recently, the trade war has also become an issue of domestic safety. A key point of safety and commercial importance is the capture and imprisonment in December 2018 of Meng Wanzhou, Chief Financial Officer of Huawei in Canada and her scheduled deportation to the United States. Huawei is the second-most important mobile supplier worldwide and the world’s top rival for providing 5G services focused to consumers. Meng faces allegations of fraud concerning an exceptionally aggressive move to violate Iran’s penalties. President Donald Trump’s declaration that he is prepared to use Meng’s deportation or prosecution in the US as a negotiation tool in a prospective trade agreement inflamed the Chinese government. China, however, has still not stipulated precise punishment in its instances, reciprocated by arresting at least two Canadians, including a previous diplomat. The chaotic court case will extend into 2019 and hang any imminent Trump-Xi talks, especially on trade or cybersecurity issues. At the unexpected June meeting between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un, China played an important part in other significant safety events. President Xi Jinping encountered the North Korean autocrat before and after the conference in Singapore. Americans who criticize the two-day conference claim that they have done nothing, and have given too much influence over the

7 Memorandum of Understanding.  
disarmament of the Peninsula to North Korea and China. The withdrawal of a significant US-South Korea military summer exercise reflects a success for China after the summit which wants to uphold its national military independence. China will remain the unseen major party in the room at the next highly anticipated conference in early 2019.

In particular, with the probable aim of hitting US objectives, China has quickly extended its Bomber Programme. China has developed man-made island bases in the South China seas in the disputed region of a number of neighbors, including the installation of cruise rockets and atomic strike bombers on the island. James Mattis, the US Defense Secretary, has pulled back from regional multilateral military exercises on what he called territorial attack and has discouraged China. In 2018, the tension between Taiwan and China stayed crucial in the U.S.-China relationship. The United States opened their de facto embassy in Taipei in June called the American Institute in Taiwan, which was welcomed without too much fanfare by prominent U.S. officials. However, in October, that didn't stop China warning America in the Taiwan Strait a part of America's so-called Navigation Freedom Missions-to send warships vessels there. Anticipate Taiwan in 2019 to be an even more hot-tone problem despite a latest provocative declaration from President Xi Jinping stating that Taiwan is united with China and Taiwan by local elections in November 2018, in which the former governing party Kuomintang, that is also currently promoting friendship with Beijing, has been running independence campaigns.

3. CHINA TERRITORIAL MARITIME DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA WITH U.S ALLIES

The deep water of the South China Sea (SCS) has been in turmoil for decades with numerous nations staking their claims in the region. More than one-third of the world’s trade passes through these water each year and under the seedbed lie immense oil reserves and also the region is one of the richest fishing ground in the world. Although the territorial maritime disputes in the SCS with China and the neighboring countries seem to be conflicts with the far-off countries like the United States. The situation in the SCS and ECS could involve the interests of the US on a wide range of reasons such as political, strategic and economic but are not limited to these. With China still emerging as a major global power, and neighbors to South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, who are U.S. treaty allies are at the border of the SCS [15].

Taiwan is surrounded by the SCS, in which the US possesses a specific security policy in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (H.R. 2479/P.L. 96 - 8 April 10, 1979) and SCS borders on existing, emerging or potential US partners, such as Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia, in Southeast Asia.

The Chinese nine-dash lines are the basis of China’s extensive claims in the South China Sea, being the foundation for the ongoing territorial conflict between China and her neighbors. Using these nine-dash lines to gain sovereignty over approximately 90 percent of the disputed waters in the South China Sea, extending are territory to 1,243 miles from the Chinese mainland. Reclaiming extensive territory in the Scarborough Shoal, Paracel Islands, and the Spratly Islands, which are man-made islands, with the presence of the Chinese military on these Island and the installation of three large reefs, which are similar to anti-aircraft guns and close-in weapons systems thereby creating a military base [16].

Chinese actions will help her achieve the following on a daily basis: China’s military presence and political influences tend to increase to the Western Pacific, Enforcing a maritime exclusion zone around Taiwan (Lyle, 2018), coercion, intimidation or political pressure on the other SCS-border countries, Enforcing an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the SCS, controlling operation of the fishing activities and oil and gas exploration in the SCS; and Aids in reaching a broader objective in her Eurasia region into becoming a regional hegemony [17].

In a report published by the Congressional Research Service on January 31, 2019, spelt out what the Chinese bases in the SCS will achieve, when in conflict with the US. The Chinese SCS military base will add to a regional network of Chinese forces (A2/AD), with the aim of keeping the U.S. military forces outside the first island chain; might contribute to the establishment of a bastion in the SCS for the emerging Chinese maritime-strategic deterrent force of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs); and the advancement of the US forces into the SCS is likely to delay in event of a larger conflict. These military bases in the SCS will give China control over all seas near the region and would complicate the United States’ ability in the following areas: military intervention in the event
of a Chinese-Taiwan crisis or conflict; complying with US defense treaties obligations to the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan; operation of the U.S. forces in the Western Pacific will be affected [18]. Operations such as regional stability maintenance, engage and build partnerships, respond to crisis and execute war plans; and prevent China in the Eurasia region into emerging as a regional hegemony.

Lowering the U.S. capacity in achieving the roles mentioned above by the Chinese would likely encourage countries of this region to review their own Defense strategy plan, as well as foreign policies, which could lead to a further change in the region’s security architecture. Certain observers believe that China tries to make use of SCS disputes in order to cast doubt among US allies and partners in the region as regards to her reliability as an ally or partner, or else to wedge the US with its regional ally and partners, thus undermining the US-led architecture of regional security, thereby improving China’s influence in the region. Others continue to fear that maritime territorial conflicts in the SCS may lead to a crisis or conflict between China and its neighbors, like Japan and the Philippines, that the United States may be drawn to such a conflict by virtue of its obligations under bilateral security agreements with Japan and the Philippines [19].

3.1 Overview of SCS Maritime Disputes with Close States

Almost the entire SCS (90%) is claimed by China. Such claims includes the China claims about 90% of the archipelago of islands, the Spratlys. The second most expansive claim is by Vietnam. It claims nearly all the the Paracel and Spratly Islands, which is seen as land feature that is most significant in the SCS. The Spratlys island close to Malaysia is claimed by it, and and two Spratly features is claimed by Brunei. The Spratlys (Kalayaan Island Group) is claimed by the Philippines as it own. China has been a party to several SCS territorial maritime disputes, particularly islands marked on Fig. 1.

![Fig. 1. Disputed Island in SCS](image.png)

The territorial maritime disputes involving China in the SCS are mentioned as follows:
**a. Paracel Islands:** Also known as Woody Island was taken in 1956 by China. It runaway and airport facilities is currently undergoing a significant expansion. Dispute between China and Vietnam over Paracel Islands situated in the SCS but presently been occupied by the Chinese.

**b. Spratly Islands:** The Spratly Islands dispute is an ongoing territorial dispute between China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei, concerning "ownership" of the Spratly Islands, a group of islands and associated "maritime features" (reefs, banks, cays, etc.) located in the South China Sea. The dispute is characterised by diplomatic stalemate and the employment of military pressure techniques (such as military occupation of disputed territory) in the advancement of national territorial claims. All except Brunei occupy some of the maritime features. There has been a sharp rise in media coverage owing mainly to China’s increasingly vocal objection to the presence of American naval vessels transiting the area in order to assert the right to freedom of navigation within international waters.

**c. Scarborough Shoal:** It is a disputed territory claimed by the Republic of the Philippines through the 1734 Velarde map, while the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) claim it through the internationally invalidated[4] nine-dash line. The shoal's status is often discussed in conjunction with other territorial disputes in the South China Sea such as those involving the Spratly Islands, and the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff. It was administered by the Philippines as part of its Zambales province, until 2012, when a standoff was initiated by China through the use of warships against fishing boats.

**d. Natuna Islands:** Dispute between China and Indonesia. On Nov. 12, 2015 China shocked the countries in the region by issuing a first-ever public statement on the Natuna Island. “Nine-Dash-Line” that lays claim to virtually all of the South China Sea, Natuna's 200-miles exclusive economic zone (EEZ) protrudes into the area defined by the Nine-Dash-Line. The Indonesian government does not currently recognize China’s so-called “Nine-Dash Line” (which overlaps with that EEZ) and so does not consider itself a claimant in any South China Sea-related maritime dispute.

**e. Senkaku Islands:** Japan took control of the uninhabited island in 1895 and lay claim on it. However, in 1970 after oil was found on the island China decided to lay claim on it promting disputes between both states.

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**Fig. 2. China Disputed Island with Japan**
3.2 Systemic Challenges to U.S-China Military Relations and Security Cooperation

United States-China defense-military ties have shown to be the most precarious component in the aggregate bilateral ties. It has already become objectively true to state that, when general US-China ties are well and well underneath defense and military aspects, military relationships are generally first to be discarded if there is an issue or crisis [4]. This has proven to be the case so often over the past twenty years (1989–2010) that one would not be It was surprising that on both sides of the Pacific military authorities were almost stunned by the re-examined nature of military ties. Military relations have been terminated, reduced or put on life support at least on 6 instances since 1989.

a. In the aftermath of the incidents in June 1989, the US military and defense ties were halted. The transfer of technology (not to be repeated) had been stopped, and most if not all contacts and defense military aspects stayed in suspension for nearly five years until 1994.

b. In March 1996, in the aftermath of Taiwan Strait PLA's demonstration of force (drill and missile trials) and in the aftermath of the United States reaction (sending of two airplane carrier fight groups, as a display of force). It was only after the presidential meetings of Clinton and Jiang in 1997 and 1998 that military ties started to advance.

c. In 1999, following a misguided US bombardment of the PRC embassy in Belgrade, capital of former Yugoslavia, the Chinese side terminated military-to-military activity in NATO's Balkan involvement. The attack murdered three Chinese people.

d. Observations indicate anger burnt down hot and long at the Pentagon because of the Chinese's 11-days detention of the United States aircraft and the long, challenging repatriation of the plane, which eventually took place about 90 days after the incidence on 3 July 2001.

e. The Bush administration declared in October 2008, in the evening before its departure, its intention to sell Taiwan weapons. The Chinese immediately withdrew from military-defense ties.

f. In 2009, when the Obama administration unveiled its own arms sales package on 29 January 2010, since the military connections have barely been reinstated.

g. On 30 January the PRC, on the basis of Xinhua, issued the Judgment to stop the exchange programmes, which was initially planned for soon, between the military in both nations and the meeting with the vice minister on strategic safety, weapons control and anti-proliferation.

h. June 11, 2014, China's involvement in RIMPAC 2014 will unlikely undo the reciprocal mistrust between China and the United States that has long increased. Though, China is much better than the other practice this year another US defense snub. Hence, China's press had this week been full of papers condemning "isolation" policies for RIMPAC and the United States rather than articles showing hopes on China-U.S. policy. RIMPAC could be mainly symbolic, but the symbolism is important in the military field, even.

i. The US and China have completed and signed an agreement on governing air-to-air clashes among the military on 16 September 2015, as the Ministry of Defense of China revealed. This will assist avoid hazardous aerial confrontation between the two military forces by offering the pilots with rules of conduct. Secondly, China committed itself to examine the conduct of its corresponding Coast Guards in a comparable trust-building which the Pentagon has pushed. This is essential in specific because the Chinese Coast Guard protecting the South China Sea is more active than the Navy.

Previously, both countries used the military-defense partnership to indicate their disagreement with the policies of the other or to act as a reaction to events. Probably, the only aspect in bilateral ties paused often for years is defense/military ties [20]. It is definitely impossible, no matter how important, to interrupt financial or political relations over disputes. Why was the relationship between the defense and the military subjected to this re-opening process? One explanation for this is that both parties considered the cost of revoking military contacts to be inadequate: suspending military relations has not put the two defense-military institutions’ valuable cooperation projects in jeopardy [21]. As mentioned in the first chapter of the article, the two defense-military institutions have not had a common safety requirement since the 1980s that
impels collaboration across the bilateral safety distinctions. Secondly, defense-military splits were definitely linked to major variations on defense problems, military incidents and the Taiwan's problem. One probable exception is the US prohibition in June 1989 for symbolic political reasons, considering the PLA's position in Tiananmen. When there were military links, the two nations could proceed with the other aspects of the generalities. The military links would then seem to have been used by both parties to record severe defense disputes, thereby alienating these distinctions from the higher order shared equities in the relationship [22].

The relations between the United States and China introduces an obstacle on both sides. The connection is strong economically and politically, driving collaboration on these fronts, for the sake of egoism. Though, defense and military affairs have a weak foundation, as this is a sphere in which each party finds the other as a possible rival for the long term. This may be an explanation of why collaboration in safety between both nations is mainly political or coordinated and generally between Chinese and U.S. civilian officials and officials rather than generals and admirals (Hyde-Price 2006). One way of thinking claims that the use of military ties as a "stress pressure valve" to turn them on and off is great since the price is small. There is a presumption that the effect on other kinds of relationships is almost nil. Some contend against such a viewpoint, implying that the prospects of security collaboration between the two military as it serves the national interests of both states will be much tougher to allow without durable and consistent defense links (not to ignore the troubling impact of deteriorating US-China defense-military ties on other Asia-Pacific states) [7]. Either direction, there is instability in the military, and defense ties between US, and China, and this is one reason (among others) why the behaviors of collaboration between the two super power have never materialized. The fragile nature of military ties has not been lost on leaders from both states.

4. INSTITUTIONAL ASYMMETRIES: CONSEQUENCES FOR FUTURE PARTNERSHIP IN DEFENSE

In fact, even the most active and friendly contact periods (1983–1989 and 1997–1999) have led to some extent of friction in the negotiation or preparing or execution of operations by the defense and army institutions in China and the United States, during their corresponding attitude to military ties [23]. Several systemic disconnections, like the difficulty of simply finding suitable partners for large-scale visits, could be discussed. Nevertheless, the most challenging to cope with is the conceptual distinctions for both parties. There are only four examples below.

4.1 Open Vs Closed

U.S. Defense representatives claim the Defense Department (DoD) is fairly open in a general statement. All the main facts and figures about DOD budgets, their troops, and their rulers are open-ended. Until 9/11, it is argued that many U.S. military installations were publicly accessible in some respects. In the previous years, DoD has regarded both military ties and safety collaboration as an impediment to the relatively poor transparency of the PLA. The United States Defense authorities have customarily deplored the absence of any essential disclosure in China's most important problems, such as their defense budget or the amount of staff in each service [24]. At the other hand, military representatives in the Chinese military easily recognize that the PLA is not as open than the U.S. military and is traditionally the Chinese government's least open section. Not only strangers but also the ordinary Chinese citizens are comparatively confined to the PLA. The Chinese claim, thus, that America's notions of military transparency do not translate to the Chinese regime. The PLA also counterposes the fact that it does not strive to be as open as the U.S. military institution and that the “actual reason” for previous PLA openness was disruption. The PLA keeps improving its transparency by publishing White Papers and the recently established National Defense Ministry (May 2008) Speaker System [5].

4.2 Extremely Centralized Vs Comparatively Decentralized Power

PLA communications, events, and services with foreigners are closely regulated, supervised, and controlled centrally. The ground troops of the PLA, Navy, Air Force, and 2nd Artillery Corps do not have any clear autonomous authority to undertake foreign affairs or security collaboration programmes. In fact, even the Central Military Commission (CMC) will have to share major decisions with certain bodies inside the Party-State for some forms of military transfers [4]. Observations say that certain high-profile military-to-military projects need to be
organized in such places as the CCP Central Committee’s Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (waishi lingdao xiaozu). The Department of Defense in the U.S. definitely manages essential activities for security collaboration and international military affairs within the interdepartmental, and it remains under the constraints of the higher guidelines and legislation. This being said, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) have certain freedom to behave both on the broad and particular existence of military connections with most states. The same applies to the United Commands and Services, which take their signals from OSD but have considerably more autonomy than their PLA Military Area and service equivalents in the creation of military interaction programmes [25,26].

The frail and the powerful VS the friends, allies and others: Foreign policy officials in the PRC think in terms of "neighboring states, developed countries and major powers" while determining which nations fit" into and how to deal with their bigger foreign policy scheme. In international affairs, China's most upcoming foreign military ties and international-security cooperation initiatives have historically been with those states that are smaller and weaker than themselves, and that are usually non-threatening to interests of China, emerging nations, and key peripheral nations. The PLA's policy against the U.S. military is that it considers itself as the weaker party vis-à-vis the U.S. military, has in the past been to tolerate actions that might display tactical weaknesses or true capacity bags [4]. As the PLA would say, "The weak do not stand up to the powerful." The U.S. defense institution, for its part, has predominantly cooperated on safety with counter-military organizations, whether allies or non-allies. Usually, security co-operation with military antagonists is not carried out. The paradigm of "ally-friend-antagonist" has proved complicated with regard to China or the Americans. China is not an ally, but an adversary. According to Kjorness [5], plans for the PLA were almost completely created on an exceptional basis, which could impede lengthy-term strategic thinking.

4.3 Principles First, Activities Later" Vs Activities First, Big Issues Later

In the past, the PLA was unwilling to engage with an international military counterpart in functional or operational activities before they reached agreement on major strategic principles that are important questions. When the fundamental consensus on the major problems has been reached, details can be developed for future operations or collaboration. The PLA (and other Chinese Foreign Affairs officials), as a prerequisite for participating in substantial military operations, generally consider reaching consensus on key strategic matters that might be referred to as "Top Down". The US defense institution has typically adopted the "Bottom Up" strategy in the field of military commitment and safety collaboration with China, and it sets its head on the PLA paradigm. In order to dispense safety distinctions from safety collaboration norms, the United States is taking an action-oriented strategy in the expectation that collaboration behaviors will contribute to confidentiality that serves to provide a more robust basis for coping with distinctions [5]. In her March 2010 negotiations with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Secretary Clinton reflected this American strategy towards safety collaboration in the face of basic safety distinctions. She said, "We can move further than the problem to more possibilities if we continue working together.

5. IMPLICATIONS OF THESE CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES

For the defense collaboration between the US and China, what are the consequences of these fundamental conceptual distinctions? Finkelstein (2010) submitted four of the following consequences;

- **Transparency**: Mutually beneficial security requires a certain amount of transparency between the two partners in institutional and operational areas. Previous experience in defense-military ties between the United States and China indicates that this might be a big issue for one or both sides. Staffing. Military ties schemes in the PRC and U.S. systems are being developed at distinct locations, and particularly at various rates. Each party is indeed likely to expect how long it will take to conclude and decide upon future projects for safety collaboration.

- **Fit**: Chinese and U.S. can be problematics for future projects in their respective safety co-operation schemes. China is not an ally for the United States, not a non-allied friend, and not an enemy. It is a so-called‘ other’ and since defense ties with China are sometimes embedded in internal policy,
safety cooperation projects are also sensitive to media and Congress scrutiny. Security collaboration with the US may be restricted in the Chinese scheme because the PLA considers itself to be the weakest partner and its fears to reveal its strengths and weaknesses are more convincing than cooperative imperatives. For distinct purposes, thus, the kind of safety collaboration regarded is important for both parties.

- **Timing:** The paradigm of "Top Down, Bottom Up" indicates that the U.S. or China consider that safety collaboration between its defense and military institutions at various points in military ties is feasible or suitable. In the past, at least, the United States had been prepared to consider collaboration before the PLA.

- **Politics:** An additional inference of the paradigm of "top down, low up," indicates that the PLA mainly considers the Military Connection to be a way towards pursuing a policy agenda at the strategic level, not inherently as an opportunity for Security Cooperation. In other words, the PLA is as much political as a competent military effort to participate in military relations. This is certainly why high-level PLA visitors to the United States are worried about who they should see, while US visitors to Beijing have concentrated on what they would see in previous years.

6. CONCLUSION

This study indicates that safety collaboration between the U.S and Chinese military defense institutions is as restricted today as at the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is mainly because most of the same key inhibitors are still involved. There is no prevalent inescapable danger to encourage defense and military institutions in China and the U.S.A to compromise in order to achieve a prevalent strategic goal. There is also no popular hurdle to allow both people to document existing distinctions in safety as a means of facilitating collaboration on major problems. In defense-military ties, the Taiwan problem is still a significant irritant. A political resolution continues ambiguous for the short period, as there is no likelihood that China will relinquish its right to use force on extremist and the US will stay on the table and support Taiwan’s self-defense. A degree of strain will, therefore, continue between the two military institutions. In addition, disagreements on regional defense problems other than Taiwan will also persist. These include the worries of Beijing and Washington regarding the deployments, stances, activities, defense policy and strategic plans of the other countries in eastern Asia. Also, views of the partnership are implicit in the basic tension between the U.S. essential interest in entry to Asia and the alleged PLA "anti-access policy." The source of tension is not likely to fade away at a certain time soon, as each military institution is working to serve its respective national command authority's broader interests. The conduct of China in the SCS, in short, represents a significant danger to the U.S. allies ' South Korean neighbors (Vietnam, Philippine, South Korea, Japan, Cambodia, and Brunei), etc.

CONSENT

The authors confirm that the manuscript is an honest, accurate, and transparent account of the study was reported; that no vital features of the study have been omitted; and that any discrepancies from the study as planned have been explained study as planned have been explained.

ETHICAL APPROVAL

This study follows all ethical practices during writing.

COMPETING INTERESTS

Authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

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